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SRI JANKA AND THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: 
A BALANCING ACT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION 
Dr. Anshu N. Chatterjee 
ABSTRACT 
Sri Lanha'.s salient position in Beijing'.s global ambitions is re.fleeted in the availability 
of the Chinese resources for its economic and defence modernisation. The country'.s 
strategic proximity to China'.s commercial sea routes and its positive reception to the BRI 
provides Beijing with an opportunity to illustrate the promise of mutual benefits o.ff ered 
in its initiative. Meanwhile, Colombo'.s acceptance of China'.s investments relies on an 
economic strategy that stths to modernist its infrastructure and naval operations that 
would secure the new economic growth sectors as a IOR state. As Beijing advances its 
geo-tconomic objectives across three continents, important questions emerge regarding 
the impact of the BRI on the aisting political and economic arrangements. Sri Lanka 
offers an informative case study towards understanding the initiative'.s implementation, 
the resulting escalation of rivalries in the IOR, and national P?:SpOnsts in the new setting. 
The ripple effects of the BRI developments present new dilemmas and weighs heavily on 
state decisions for a country that finds itself in the center of great power rivalry. 
Keywords: The BRI, Great Power Rivalry, Debt-Diplomacy, Balancing India 
and China 
INTRODUCTION 
Sri Lanka's salient position in Beijing's global commercial and strategic ambitions 
is apparent in the Belt and Road Initiative's (BRI's) rapid implementation in the 
country utilising Chinese development aid and defence agreements. Sri lankas 
strategic proximity to China's sea routes and its positive reception to the BRI 
related-developments provides Beijing with an opponunity for illustrating the 
promise of mutual benefits offered in the BRI (The Economist, 2020). Initiated in 
2013, China's BRI seeks to advance the country's global economic framework that 
produced its remarkable growth in the previous two decades, a framework that 
experienced a slowdown after 2007 due to structural issues in emerging markets 
(Blanchard and Flint, 2017). The People's Republic of China's (PRC's) plan of 
investing in a global transit system, including land and sea routes, is designed to 
overcome the structural barriers and revive the high levels of economic growth. The 
coordinated expansion of a defence infrastructure ensures the security of Beijing's 
economic objectives (Clarke, 2018). As PRC advances its geo-economic objectives 
across three continents, imponant questions emerge regarding the impact of the 
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BRI on the commercial and defence ties in countries that lie on its path. Sri Lanka's 
openness to the BRI related-developments offers an informative case study towards 
understanding the initiative's implementation at the local level, the resulting 
escalation of rivalries in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and national responses in 
the new setting. 
Colombo's acceptance of China's investments and the promise of benign growth 
reflects its economic policy centered upon the expanding commercial trade network 
at its maritime door. In order to develop its ports, as well as its transit systems, to 
take advantage of the new commercial opportunities, the state requires necessary 
financing to modernise its infrastructure and naval operations that would secure 
the new economic growth sectors. Yet, the shift in the global power structures 
along with the availability of aid from China produces new external pressures as the 
BRI disrupts existing political and economic arrangements in host countries such 
as Sri Lanka. The ripple effects of the BRI developments present new dilemmas 
for a country that is still in the process of reconciliation in the post-war period 
and now finds itself in the center of great power rivalry, which not only presents 
opportunities but also weighs on state dectsions. 
THE DYNAMICS OF SINO-SRI LANKA ALLIANCE 
Sri Lanka lies in the path of two-thirds of the world's oil and over half of its 
commercial traffic. The extensive blue water depth capacity of its Colombo Port 
also enhances its strategic and commercial position. Subsequently, Beijing's targeted 
efforts to secure influence with the island's authorities and its commercial sector 
since the 1990s has paid off with the Colombo's easy acceptance of the BRI plans. 
China's current investment in the country amounts to US$ l l billion, of which 
US$8 billion is associated with the BRI (Foizee, 2020). 
Analysts often point to China's widespread presence in Sri Lanka's affairs as an 
example of a "debt diplomacy," which forces a country to give up its sovereignty 
for the lender country financing its debt (Moramudali, 2018). Yet, the Sino-Sri 
Lankan relationship is more complex than just debt diplomacy. Beijing's security 
and economic aid during the relentless and costly Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) insurgency that evolved into a prolonged violent conflict stretching over 
three decades 1983-2009), produced a foundation for Sino-Sri l..ankan alliance 
in the 1990s (Hashim, 2010, p. 207). This bilateral relationship also expanded 
through the 1990s when Sri Lanka needed aid due to the emergence of the Asian 
crisis that threatened to reduce Sri Lanka's exports and remittances. The threat of 
reduced revenues produced new stresses upon the state at the time of growing 
national defence requirements. Meanwhile, India's botched attempt at peacekeeping 
and negotiating between Colombo and the LITE produced a determination among 
Sri l..ankan authorities to seek out a counterweight to India's influence (Destradi, 
2012). Moreover, Western countries' ban on arms sales to countries accused of 
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human rights violations, as Sri Lanka had been over its dealing with the LTIE 
insurgency, removed them as a countervailing option increasing Sri Lanka's reliance 
on China for defence aid. In the final phase of the insurgency in 2007, China is 
credited with having tipped the war against the LTIE by providing US$36 million 
worth of ammunition and ordnance sales to the state. China also gifted the country 
six F7 jet fighters (Page, 2009). 
After the insurgency ended in 2009, Sri Lanka's significance to China and other 
countries seeking to expand their influence in the IOR became increasingly 
apparent. China remained a crucial ally to Sri Lanka in the United Nations Security 
Council; it blocked efforts to reprimand Sri Lanka for human rights violations in 
the final years of the war (Destradi, 2012). India, in 2012, along with Russia, joined 
China in backing Colombo in the United Nations Human Rights Commission's 
efforts to investigate the state of violence at the end of the war. Subsequently, 
confronted by a weak economy. represented by growing interest payments that 
amounted to approximately 30 percent of the government expenses (World Bank, 
2020), Colombo saw China's BRI funds as an opportunity to address investment 
shortages in order to participate in the growing commercial trade in the IOR. 
SRI LANKA'S MARITIME DEVELOPMENTS 
The island's proximity to the busy sea lines of communication (SLOCs) provides Sri 
Lanka with an opportunity to grow its blue economy. This opportunity is a double-
edged sword as increased traffic in its sea lanes produces a need for furthering its 
security in its economic exclusion zones, which have seen a rise in illicit activities 
associated with drug transportation and threats to its fisheries. Sri Lanka also seeks 
to address maritime security gaps that became visible during the LTIE insurgency 
when the radical group successfully used small boats to transport arms and launch 
attacks of Sri Lanka Navy. Soon after President Xi Jinping publicised China's BRl 
objectives, Colombo announced its maritime strategy 2025, which included plans 
to tap into the resources made available by China's investments. China's previous 
presence at Sri Lanka's ports as a development and defence partner made Sri Lanka 
an ideal candidate for mutual growth objectives and an essential node in the BRI. 
China's presence in Sri Lanka is prominent at two of Sri Lanka's largest ports, 
Colombo and Hambantota. In 2014, the two countries reached an agreement that 
would convert the Colombo Port into a smart city at the cost of US$!. 4 billion, 
to be financed by the Chinese (Rossi, 2019). The contract for this development 
went to China Communication Construction Company (CCCC) and China 
Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC), both Chinese state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). According to the agreement, China would control the expanded areas that 
would be added by reclamation. China Merchant Port Harbour Limiteds (CMPHL) 
99-year lease and 85 percent stake in the South Container Terminal at Port in 
Colombo, renovated with Chinese funding in 2013-2014, exemplifies the type of 
50 
Dr. Ar1shu N Cha1tcr1cc 
agreements that emerged in exchange for China's investment (Chowdhary, 2015). 
Several observers highlight that these agreements potentially provide China with 
the strategic location and a site for docking People's Liberation Army-Navy ships, 
although both Colombo and Beijing have denied the these ports are being used for 
military purposes, especially after Chinese submarines made dock visits in 2014 
(Singh, 2015; Pattanaik, 2019). 
The more controversial decision illustrating Beijing's prominence in Sri Lanka is 
the 2016 transference of Hambantota's port authority for 99-years to CMPHL in 
exchange for US$ 1.12 billion to help service Colombo's US$ 66 billion national 
debt in 2016 (Moramudali, 2018). China's pre-existing presence at the port 
since 2007 allowed the two countries to transfer authority to China without 
extensive and transparent negotiations. In 2007, the CHEC had constructed the 
port for Colombo financed through loans from the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank 
of China. In 2009, the state also borrowed another US$190 million from EXIM 
for the construction of Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport (also by CHEC) 
near Hambantota (Wignaraja et al., 2020). At the time, the project promised to 
generate jobs in President Mahinda Rajapaksa's home constituency and divert port 
traffic from Colombo. Although Hambantota's intended commercial feasibility has 
yet to pan out for Sri Lanka, its proximity to major SLOCs and India, presents 
strategic and surveillance possibilities for China. After gaining authority over the 
management of Hambantota in 2017, China has invested more towards increasing 
the port's operational capacity and built a fueling depot managed by the China 
Petroleum and Chemical Corporation. 
Not surprisingly, the transfer of Hambantota Port's authority to a Chinese SOE 
did not go unnoticed by domestic constituencies and the political opposition. It 
also produced criticism regarding the benefits of the BRI-related programmes for 
local economies (Al Jazeera, 2017; Daily Mirror, 2017). The lease also ratcheted 
up pressure from India and Sri Lanka's other development partners, who are 
concerned about China's expanding prominence. Furthermore, Colombos 
external engagements reflect attempts to balance China's influence that takes into 
consideration the growing rivalries in the IOR, pressures from Sri Lanka's existing 
development and economic partners, and its democratic responsibilities. 
COMPELLING EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC FORCES 
In 2013, the Mahinda Rajapaksa administration, often considered favorable towards 
China due to close ties established towards the end of LTTE insurgency, illustrated 
tts willingness to open the country to the Belt and Road proposal to bolster the 
country's infrastructure. In the 2015 election, however, the administration lost 
the election to Maithripala Sirisena, who then became responsible for overseeing 
BRI's implementation and addressing the accompanying financial, domestic, and 
external pressures that called for maintaining sovereignty and balancing previous 
economic and strategic relations. 
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Upon coming to power, the Sirisena administration immediately sought to address 
the issues associated with the BRI agreements. In 2015, the state halted the 
US$ 1. 4 billion Colombo Port City project to renegotiate the terms, a move produced 
by pressures from the citizens concerned about sovereignty and rising state debt. 
The project's reinstatement in 2016 and the leasing of additional 110 hectares of 
reclaimed land to CCCC reflected the dire economic pressures confronting the 
Sri Lankan government and China's considerable influence exerted through its 
dominant presence in the infrastructural projects and as an important source of 
defence-related acquisitions (Reuters, 2016). The matters came to head in 2016, 
when the state handed 80 percent stake in the Hambantota Port to CMPHL for 
99 years and leased out another 15,000 acres of the surrounding land for Chinese 
economic zones due to an upcoming debt payment. Violent protests broke out in 
the country led by Buddhist organisations and the left-oriented Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna (People's Liberation Front) trade unions associated with workers at the 
ports (Al Jazeera, 2017; Daily Mirror, 2017). The protestors demanded the state 
reconsider its decisions, although the port at the time was considered a white 
elephant that had yet to prove its economic feasibility (Marlow, 2018). 
Although the domestic protests did not produce a significant reversal in the BRI 
policy or the lease of Hambantota, Colombo's economic and defence agreements 
since 2016 indicate state's shift towards balancing China's influence. An increasing 
number of questions regarding the debt and economic policy combined with 
the rising of new global rivalries compel the state towards a different approach. 
The country's adoption of the liberal economic model since the 1980s pegged its 
economic growth to export markets and tourism revenues, which exert pressures on 
continuing trade relations, especially in the context of deficit with China. Meanwhile, 
both India and the United States, two of Sri Lanka's most significant trade partners, 
continue to express their apprehensions regarding China's increasing presence in 
the country (Blanchard and Flint, 2017, p. 234). Colombo's management of ties 
with these two countries illustrate the state's attempts at countering China's clout. 
The Sri Lanka-U.S. bilateral engagement began in the 1950s mainly through the 
U.S. Agency for International Development and Trade. That engagement deepened 
in the late 1990s through security cooperation when the United States designated 
the LTTE as a terrorist organisation and initiated intelligence sharing that assisted 
Sri Lanka in containing the insurgency. Washington's actions are often linked to the 
increasing need to contain terrorism globally as well as respond to the rising presence 
of China in the region. The U.S. declaration of LITE as a terrorist organisation in 
1998 also reduced the latter's external financing sources and its ability to acquire 
arms. In the post-2001 period, the United States also initiated defence-associated 
support to Sri Lanka by providing non-deadly systems. Since then, Sri Lanka-U.S. 
ties have transitioned from almost negligible into a constructive alliance. After the 
devastating 2004 tsunami, U.S. humanitarian assistance included an economic 
package and rescue efforts by the U.S. Navy and Marines that were well-received. 
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Two important variables continue to promote bilateral ties between Sri Lanka and 
the United States. first, Sri Lanka's economy relies heavily on garment exports to 
developed economies, such as the United States.Japan, and Germany, which are also 
a source of development aid. Despite expanding commercial relations with China, 
Sri Lanka's largest single export market is the United States, accounting for roughly 
24 percent of the country's overseas sales (OEC, 2020). While China is Sri Lanka's 
largest trade partner, that relationship has produced a deficit favoring China. More 
recently, United States and Sri Lanka have also signed a few defence agreements 
and are increasing their naval cooperation (Ramchandran, 2019). Washington's 
recognition of Colombo's needs that influence its China policy promoted better ties 
in the past decade. 
Increased cooperation between the United States and Sri Lanka is most visible in 
Sri Lanka's maritime modernisation efforts in the past decade. The modernisation 
is necessary due to its increasing need for maritime security contextualised by IOR 
trade expansion and a growing rivalry in the region. The USS Nimitz's visit to Sri 
Lanka during the Galle Dialogue in 2016 as the first U.S. naval carrier to visit in 32 
years initiated a new era of naval cooperation between the two countries. The United 
States also granted US$39 million to boost Sri Lanka's maritime security, donated a 
cutter, and is aiding the formation of the Sri Lankan marine corps (Bureau of South 
and Central Asian Affairs, 2020). Consequently, Sri Lankan navy increased its 
presence in joint exercises involving the United States and other defence partners, 
such as India at Malabar, which indicated Sri Lanka's willingness to cooperate in 
efforts to counter China's growing influence in the IOR. More importantly, the 
United States and Sri Lanka also renewed and expanded the Acquisition and 
Cross Service Agreement (ACSA) in 2017, a move that stirred controversy among 
domestic groups critical of external pressures. Though the return of the pro-China 
Rajapaksa government in 2019 may be viewed as a problem for the efforts of the 
United States to bolster its relations with Sri Lanka, it is important to note that the 
original ACSA in 2007 was approved of by the same Rajapaksa administration. 
After returning to power in 2019, the Rajapaksa administration also unexpectedly 
sought to renegotiate the Hambantota lease with Beijing to appease the domestic 
groups critical of its growing reliance on China (Lo, 2019). Some political factions 
in Sri Lanka also look towards the United States and its allies to counter China's 
clout (Ayres, 2019). 
Sri Lanka's recent bilateral agreements with India also illustrate the significance of 
the external actors in decision-making. It is important to note that along with India's 
proximity, which casts a shadow on its diplomatic and developmental decision 
making, India is one of the islands' largest trading partners. It is the source of 70 
percent of the cargo at Colombo port and has provided estimated US$ 2.5 billion 
in development assistance over the years (Chazan, 2017). Since the initiation of the 
BRI projects, Colombo has sought to ease India's apprehensions regarding China's 
growing footprint in Sri Lanka through several statements and decisions. 
S3 
New Delhi's threat perceptions, influenced by the disputed territories with China 
in India's north, shape its concerns of the BRI that runs close to its borders and in 
the case of Azad Kashmir, through it (Chakma, 2019). Although Azad Kashmir 
has been held by Pakistan since 1948, India continues to claim it as an occupied 
territory. After the British departed in 1947, China claimed parts of Kashmir and 
the state of Arunanchal Pradesh in India's northeast. The two countries dealt with 
the dispute through diplomacy until 1962, when a war between them resulted in 
a loss of territory for India. The BRI-related developments in the proximity of the 
disputed border regions have heightened tensions and triggered deadly skirmishes 
between China and India (2017 and 2020). Both China and India seek to develop 
and increase their security infrastructure near the disputed areas. India's Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi's refusal to attend the BRI summit in June 2019 is an 
indicator of the lack of agreement between the two countries on the BRl. 
New Delhi's responses to China's aggressive actions in the north includes increasing 
accommodation of its neighbors in the IOR and, more specifically, Colombo's 
requirements. After China announced its BR! plans in South Asia in 2013, India 
adopted a "Neighborhood First" policy to address what it sees as an attempt of 
encirclement of India by China. In 2015, Modi announced New Delhi's Security 
and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) project, which sought to develop India's 
maritime infrastructure. Additionally, the state recently shifted its attention and 
resources from its historically strong mainland naval ports, its eastern, southern, 
and western commands respectively, to the more strategically located islands of 
Andaman and Nicobar (ANI) for better surveillance and defence capabilities. In 
2018, Sri Lanka also participated in the 10th biennial MILAN exercises with the 11 
other countries in the vicinity of these islands (Chakma, 2019). The regularisation 
of the lndo Sri Lanka bilateral maritime exercise series, SLINEX also indicates 
increasing coordination and cooperation. Prime Minister Modi's two visits to 
Colombo in the past five years and a promise of development aid worth half a 
billion dollars sent a signal of future positive prospects between the two countries. 
In response to New Delhi's overtures, both Sirisena and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, upon 
corning to power in 2015 and 2019 respectively, visited India soon after their 
election. Most recently, Sri Lanka announced it would prioritise India's interests 
during strategic decision-making (PTI, 2020). 
Colombo's pragmatic responses designed to balance its allies and respond to 
its domestic protesters also led to the selection of Japan and India as pref erred 
developers for the upgrading of the blue-water port at Trincomalee. Japan's historical 
relationship with the country as a key development partner and an important 
source of commercial revenues could not be ignored when it made an offer to aid 
port developments. Although the decision was delayed when Rajapaksa's Sri Lanka 
People's Freedom Alliance won the election in 2019, Japanese presence remains 
apparent in the upgrading of Trincomalee. 
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CONCLUSION 
Chinas narrative of mutual benefits embedded in the BRls design to accomplish 
global economic and related security goals has produced widespread acceptance 
of the initiative in several countries located on its planned land and sea routes. 
For those willing to participate in the initiative, Beijing promises development and 
defence aid with apparently flexible terms to support the economic and security 
agendas of governments in power. Yet, the BRI is a commercial and a military venture 
that advances Chinas ability to influence emerging markets and to boost its security 
arrangements at the global level. The use of Chinas SOEs and accompanying 
security apparatus for implementing the BRI projects provides Beijing with 
extensive surveillance and influence across the BRls path. The implementation of 
the BRI produces new and important economic and security imperatives for the 
countries on its path as well as other powers that are engaged with these countries. 
Furthermore, the resulting integration of markets will no doubt influence future 
global relations as well. Not surprisingly, the BRI'.s expansion has resulted in a 
cautious reaction among other global and competing regional powers that view 
the initiative as displacing their existing commercial and security arrangements. 
Countering moves, or rearranging of ties, because of the BRI becomes necessary for 
countries, which are producing new rivalries in the IOR while intensifying existing 
ones, such as the one between India and China. 
Colombo'.s participation in the BRI project illustrates the complexity that surrounds 
the invitation of the BRI for developing economies as they attempt to take advantage 
of Chinas offer and accommodate others at the same time. No doubt, Sri Lanka 
requires new resources for advancing its economy under market-led framework 
that it adopted in the 1980s and 1990s. As a prospective middle income country 
and an emerging market, Sri Lanka seeks investments, or grants, for increasing 
its commercial infrastructure, energy supplies, and related defence technologies 
that allow it to take advantage of growing use of the SLOCs located in its EEZs. 
Simultaneously, external and internal pressures require that Colombo balances 
its global relationships and also respond to the demands for transparency and 
sovereignty from its constituencies. 
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